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Abstract 
 Is not easy to make in a few lines a presentation of Habermas's 
thinking regarding to public opinion in the history of political thought. One 
of the most interesting sections of all habermasian discussion – developed 
not only in his opera History and critiques of public opinion but in others too 
– lies in clarifying how the public opinion concept was evaluate by 
philosophers of different political orientations during the modern era.  
According to Habermas, to do this analysis should go under the tracks of 
Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel. Some of these authors appreciate and 
value the role of the public opinion while others do not believe in its 
function. It is not a coincidence that the"classic" treatment of the public 
opinion concept culminates with Kant, the author, who is considered one of 
the greatest luminaries in Europe. While we find in Hegel a devaluation of 
the public opinion, compared with the science, and this depreciation is 
parallel to the depreciation of the civil society against the State. 
On the other side we will see other contemporary authors analysis regarding 
public opinion, like Nicola Matteuci and Giuseppe Bedeschi and their 
thoughts compared with Habermas thoughts. 
To understand the function of public opinion I will show its specific 
characteristics throughout history from the Greek polis up to the French 
Revolution and the creation of the bourgeoisie class. 
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Introduction 
 Before I go on the historical story according to Habermas manner, 
where he tells the public opinion position in the modern european society, I 
think it is worth noting the sharp criticism, through which the philosopher 
wanted to characterize the public opinin concept.  
 We should note that in a theoretical perspective, for the philosopher, 
the  public opinion is characterized of a dualism form. The Public of public 
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opinion stay so natural in its content and has nothing to do with private 
affairs of an  individual or another, with one group or another but it has to do 
with the public or said it differently in latin – like Habemas does – la res 
publica.  
 Meanwhile is revealed another sense of this opinion public, the fact 
that public opinion is like this because is realized under “the sunlight”. In 
this way the public opinion appears as the perfect antithesis of every secret 
meeting. Where the agreements between individuals tend, at least in part, 
have their dark and secret character, the public opinion for  its nature is open 
to all. 
 It’s not a coincidence that public opinion is created in West at the 
same time with the genesis and affirmation of Greek polis. In fact these were 
the first democratic regimes, which have left a mark on history. In an 
institution with weak vertical structure of power - as notes Nicola Matteucci, 
in sincrom with Habermas thought,- The Greeks were the first to look for big 
debates in public squares (exactly agora) to discuss the political and 
administrative issues of the day, to appoint or cancel different labor 
positions, etc.. 15.  
 Also we should remember that public opinion, precisely in virtue of 
Hellenic origin past but rooted, has always the doxa or epistemology 
character. Regarding doxas it has the opinion character to looking the things, 
in total contradiction with what characterizes the scientific discussion led by 
rigorous methods, so the epistemology. 
 In another book dedicated to public opinion, Habermas has expressed 
that, in its being, not epistemological, we have both strong and  weak 
point 16. The weak point if we want to call it like this, stay on the fact that we 
are talking about opinions, points of view that doesn’t necessarily 
presuppose the indisputable conclusion of the truth which is part of science. 
Exactly this moment lack of rigor inside of the public opinion, has always 
exploited in centuries, the opponents of democracy, since Plato in his book 
The Republic17.  The public opinion is like this because it is the opinion of 
"the public". Individuals who have vital interests on a specific issue and 
don’t have specific competencies (legal, administrative, economic and 
financial, cultural, etc.) Some others u leverdis opinioni, variable point of 
view, sometimes unilateral; an infallible critical precision of the 
mathematician or the philosopher 18.  So, he does not attempt to present the 
truth, to materialize it. However, what may seems a weakness of the public 
                                                          
15    Price,V., (1993). L’opinione pubblica, Bologna, Il Mulino, p. 9. 
16 Habermas, J., (1978). Teoria e prassi nella società tecnologica, Roma-Bari, Laterza 
p.111. 
17 Habermas, J., (2001). Verità e giustificazione: saggi filosofici, Roma-Bari, Laterza, p.133. 
18 Habermas, J, from Ceppa, L., (2007), Morale, diritto, politica, Torino, Einaudi, p. 48. 
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opinion, appears as one of his unquestionable strong points. In fact the 
pretense of the truth possession, first of all from political point of view 
(authoritarianism, oligarchy), get into dogmatism. While, in the moment that 
public opinion is the result of the public debate, is positive the fact that for 
principe it is  excluded  from any dogmatic rigidity. It is always ready to 
oppugn the taken positions. As such, the public opinion is traversed from 
current disagreement, different points of view: all these remain the essence 
of democracy 19. 
 One of the most interesting sections of the Habermas debate, 
developed not only in the The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Spherebut also in other works, make a clarification of the way how during 
the modern era, philosophers of different political orientation have welcomed 
and valued the concept of public opinion.   
 According to Habermas, we should follow the steps of Hobbes. In 
fact, it is known that this great philosopher developed his reflections around 
the mid of 600s, when the crisis of the English absolute monarchy started, 
which ended with the murder of Charles I Stewart and the affirmation for the 
first time of the Republicanism in the Anglo Saxon world20. 
 Thomas Hobbes, a believer of anoppressive power and aabsolute 
state strickness, from this point of view could not see with a kind of disbelief 
the exaltation of the public opinion that meanwhile was spreading in almost 
all Eupope and Continent21. In  the  spot l ight  of  absolute  s t r ic tness ,  
for  Hobbes,  the  publ ic  opinion with his  cr i t ics  and different  
points  of  view could not  appear  as  a  potent ia l  dis integrant  of 
the  s tr ict ly  uni ty  and uncondit ional  of  the  sovereign power .  
 Nicola Matteucci agreed with the Habermas analysis and pointed that 
the public opinion for Hobbes is sensitive to the punishment, from the 
moment that he “brings within the State a kind of anarchy and corruption”22. 
In fact, to achieve an idea or specific program, the citizens leave aside the 
isolated state of the individual and build the partial society that Hobbers 
didn’t hesitate to compare with the parasitic organism, which live within a 
big organism (that’s why it is the State) distributing the sources even those 
that were very dangerous.23 As a lways,  this  point  of  view of 
Hobbes has  a  perfect  s t r ict ly logic . At the moment, when it looks for 
the revenge toward unity, absolute invisibility and superiority of the State 
towards any other force that move in the society, the public opinion could be 
                                                          
19 Sartori, G., (1991). Democrazia. Cos’è, Milano, Rizzoli. 
20Pacchi, A., (1983). Introduzione a Hobbes, Roma-Bari, Laterza. 
21Habermas, J., (2003). Il discorso filosofico della modernità, Rome-Bari, Laterza, p. 69. 
22 Matteucci, N.,(2004).Opinione pubblica in Bobbio, N.,-Matteucci, N.,-Pasquino G., 
(curated by), Dizionario di politica, Torino, UTET, p. 637. 
23Pacchi, A., Introduzione a Hobbes, cit., p. 71 and on. 
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seen with a deep disbelief. The contradictory ideology arises from the public 
opinion, which could be potential enemies of the State. Also parties can 
arise, which threaten to secese from the State and to penetrate the rebellion, 
anarchy and distruction, as Hobbes had in mind the bloody English civil 
war.24.  
 Vice versa, the object is not the revenge toward the unity, and the 
indisputable superiority of the State in the civil society,but the affirmation of 
the limited character of the power, the aim which should be only the 
guarantee of the natural rights of the individual, the concept of the public 
interest become important and gets value. Some decade later, Hobbes always 
in the Anglo-Saxon philosophic tradition, at the end of 600s, one of the 
greatest liberal writers, John Locke, aCalvinist and exponent of the great 
bourgeois did not hesitate to listen the praising of the public opinion and its 
function within a State, which looks for the freedom value rights aside those 
of authority25. 
 Civil society, which for Hobbes is impossible to be considered before 
and out of the State, from the moment that the individuals without the state 
authority are destined to oppose and fight each other, as in the State nature 
where bellum omnium contra omnes, for Locke it results to be previous from 
the State logically and chronologically. In fact, individuals, nowadays, know 
the state of civilization in the natural State. They know the private property, 
religious and moral life, traditions, customs, family, etc. But what is missing 
is the binding power precisely that of the State, in the state to resolve the 
disputes between yours and mine, ending the disputes between the 
individuals based on the norm of constitutional and public rights26. So, the 
State does not arise to create the civil society, but simple to guarantee the 
natural rights of the individual, which are parts of the civil society. In this 
way, it means that what the State needs to do is the consciousness, opinion 
and religious freedom, that later will be the main principle where derives and 
affirms the public opinion. In a State, where the power is limited, the variety 
of tendencies, parties and ideology is welcomed but inevitable. The public 
opinion in such a State, that today we define as a liberal and 
parlamentaryconstitutional represent a fundamental value nothing inevitable.   
 Until now, in Habermas’ step, it is shown that the public opinion in 
the Western political tradition, at least in the modern period has had a 
connotation in terms of liberal, but projected to defend the individual rights 
against the defined powers that suppressed them.   
 Another very important author of 700s, Rousseau, we are in front of 
other direction that in a way is a turn. He is an implicit supporter of 
                                                          
24Habermas, J., Il discorso filosofico della modernità,cit., p. 133. 
25Viano, C.A., (1997). Il pensiero politico di Locke, Roma-Bari, Laterza, p.21. 
26Pacchi, A.,  Introduzione a Hobbes,cit, p. 141.  
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Republicanism against any monarchy, but differently from Locke, he looks 
with a great disbelief the parliamentary representation. Though 
Enlightenment and Romanticsm, he is considered as a representative of 
Enlightenmentat the moment when he urges the rulers of his period to release 
from the Middle Agerelics that according to him were the parliaments27. So 
the deep reflection of Locke for the inevitable role that the parliament 
members have as the representatives of the people’s will, so of the public 
opinion, is undiscussable that is overpassed. This not because Rousseau 
devaluates tout court the concept of public opinion. Even in some cases, he 
has a theological cult of the people’s will. For him, the voluntas populi is 
voluntas dei synonym28. He is convinced that the people do not live for the 
institutions, but vice versa the institutions should serve the people. It is 
undiscussable that he excludes the political bodies, parliament members, 
ministers; they should have an instrumental role, as a real administrative 
ogan of the people’s will. But how is he represented to the people’s will? 
Every representative intervention or structure is excluded by him (we should 
not forget that Rousseau was Swiss, from Geneve; that’s why he felt so much 
the experiences of cantonal self-governing, which are of a special importance 
in the tradition of Helvetic Republic)29. 
 So, the public opinion is important for Rousseau, but the difference 
of his thought compared with other analysed authors stay in the fact that he 
does not have any goal that the public opinion should seem in this indirect 
way, only implied. Thus means that the people do not need a mediator. They 
need only the union of the mass in the central squares and through a public 
debate to choose the ministers and the most important for Rousseau, to make 
laws. It is obvious that the whole institutional architecture of the liberal 
State, firstly the division of the tripartite division of power, cited by Locke 
and after by Montesquieu, overthrown by Rousseau, with the same contempt 
with which he is released from the parliaments, “Middle Age relics”. The 
State could not have other power foundations expect the people that are 
united and enacted passionately. Derathé noticed in the classic Rousseau, a 
clear memory of the classicalRepublics, Greek Polis and especially that of 
Sparta, which with its authoritarism could not have influenced and attracted 
him30.   
 Rousseau believes that the human being is better than the nature. It is 
the corruptive impact of civilization that has obscured the good aim of the 
human and has turned him into a corruptive creature31. The science,  ar ts  
                                                          
27 Casini, P., (2008). Introduzione a Rousseau, Roma-Bari, Laterza, p. 71. 
28Bobbio, N., (1999). Teoria generale della politica, Torino, Einaudi, p. 61. 
29Cassirer,E.,(1967). Il problema Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Firenze, La Nuova Italy, p. 137. 
30Derathé,R., (1983). Leggere Rousseau, Roma, Editori Riuniti, p. 196. 
31Rousseau, J-J, ( 1970). Scritti politici, Torino, UTET, p. 673. 
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and technics  ins tead of  ver ifying the born kindness  of  the 
human,  has  helped to  dest roy i t . Precisely, the techniques of the 
political art are those that contribute to rip off the human from his origin and 
in his alienation to understand and search for the common good. 
 For Rousseau, the concept of the public opinion come as a will of 
everyone, which gathered in assembly, approve and govern directly, without 
any kind of intercession or representation. We could call his ideal even 
utopic, opposing all the big States that now represent almost every political 
reality of his time. 
 Rousseau looks at the small State remembering the Helvetic 
experience, thus the State where all the citizens are connected with a moral 
brotherhood. All know each other, know their needs and for this reason can 
govern in the best way32.In  fact ,  for  Rousseau the opinion is  
publ ic  in  the  essence and contruct ion. He does not contemplate any 
private ideals divergence, the dissent of the people gathered as an assembly 
is simply inconceivable for him. This is for the reason that every deviated 
desired is simply a bad desire that the other, those that listen and perceive 
appropriately the collective needs, has the right to make and to lead in the 
right direction even through the force if it will be necessary33. 
 But in the same time, this public opinion has not an artificial aspect. 
So, it is not an untouchable thing, fruit of the convergence and divergence of 
the ideals and different genres of the thought, public debate, conflict of 
newspaper and other periodicals, etc., that the liberal concept of public 
opinion has taught us. (as Habermes has emphasised). The public opinion for 
philosophy is transformed into a unite voice that comes from the people of 
the assembly, who ask for things without interest for the opponents, even 
oppressing them34. 
 One of the greatest researchers of the philosophy and political theory 
of the 900s, the Italian Nicola Matteuci,has given us a portrait of Rousseau 
as an unclear supporter and at once denying the concept of public opinion. It 
is worth to mention his words, even though the portrait that Matteucci gives 
for Rousseau it is convergent for many reasons compare to what Habermas 
wrote in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,as follows: 
 “The public opinion with Rousseau continues to express moral 
judgement, but these werejudgements that have a direct coincidence with the 
politics and the institutional channel through which they are expressed. In 
fact, in Social Contract he reevaluates the instutite of censure, the Minister 
                                                          
32AA.VV., (1994). Tre letture di Rousseau, Roma-Bari, Laterza, p. 93. 
33Solari, G., (1985). La formazione storica e filosofica dello Stato moderno, Napoli, Guida, 
p.54. 
34Matteucci, N., (1984). Alla ricerca dell’ordine politico. Da Machiavelli a Tocqueville, 
Bologna, Il Mulino, p.14. 
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of the Law of public opinionbeing the censor: “As the law is the declaration 
of the general will, the censorship is the declaration of the public 
judgement”. The censor is not the referee of the people opinion, but only his 
expression and could not get away from the habits, thus if the censure is 
useful to preserve the habits, it has not replaced them when they are 
corrupted. Rousseau “general will” wanting to overpass the distinction 
between the politics and moral shows the tied correlation between the 
peoples’sovreignity and public opinion, laws and customs and sees in the 
public opinion “the real constitution of the State”. Rousseau could not 
develop his discussion as the fact that in his direct democracy could not give 
the tension between the private and public spheres, of the modern State 
himself within which spaces for the public opinion are created, and also 
because he defines the public opinion as costumes or habits, whichare the 
heritage of the past or are formed spontaneously and are not the fruit of the 
rational public discussion, as a genuine public opinion” 35.  
 So this part is really relevant exactly because – as we posed–there are 
registered a series of important convengences with Habermas reflections. 
Even the German researcher, as the Italian one, tries to highlight that the 
concept of public opinion of Rousseau discovers an unclear value, which 
should be clarified. On one hand, it is obvious that since it protects the 
people sovereignity, he could not attribute to a kind of opinion “form”. It is 
true that the way how he sees the public opinion, has the character of a thing 
that could never be private, which means unconnected, it disagrees from one 
subject to another. Then, Rousseau – only in this regard- seems like the 
lawyer of the public opinion. How could it be different from the moment that 
he is one of the outstanding and great theorician of the modern period? In 
fact, it is known that the French revolutionaries in 1789 and later, especially 
in 1793, see at him one of their deepthinspirator36.So, as many time that the 
people sovreignity is asked we should understand that the legitimate power 
belongs to the people, it could not be mentioned the inevitable importance of 
public opinion37. 
 But in the same time, the concept of public opinion needs a liberal 
State, which gives the freedom to the thoughts through other trends. It could 
be said that the concept of public opinion could bloom only where it is not 
prejudice – as the Rousseau did – from the idea of an utopic and perfect State 
in which the disagreement of the thoughts it is seen as a kind of disruption or 
destruction. That’s why, on one hand,overpassing the instiction of the 
                                                          
35Matteucci, N., Opinione pubblica, in  Bobbio, N., -Matteucci, N.,- Pasquino,G.,   
Dizionario di politica, cit, p. 637-638. 
36Talmon, J., (1997). Le origini della democrazia totalitaria, Bologna, Il Mulino, p. 201. 
37Habermas, J., (2010) Storia e critica dell’opinione pubblica, Milano, Mondadori, p. 61 and 
on. 
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political ethics, Rousseau – same as Matteucci in the above mentioned part – 
finds in public opinion “the real constitution of the State”and it is not a 
written constitution that is repeated as many time as the people gathered in 
an assembly and approved unanimously its will.   
 Thus, the idea of the public opinion as a product of rational public 
debate comes less, we can say, to Rousseau: the public opinion – as 
Matteucci expressed – coincides with the “habits’, then in a series of ethical 
and civil behaviours, which are not discussed or examined rationally but are 
inherited from the past and as such are accepted and not discussed38. 
 The concept of public opinion that takes these forms in Rousseau is 
confirmed again by Matteucci from the reference that he does to the 
censure.The public opinion, as it is perceived in a liberal optic, does not look 
kindly upon censure: In fact, it is only an institute where some people 
pretend the right to oppose the free demostration of the other people thoughts 
only for the fact that they are considered as unapproriate and do not match 
with the majority opinion. So, in the political thought of Rousseau, there is 
no place for minorities, for the dissent voices or each element that represent 
the liberal authentic civilization. That’s why, with a contradiction only for 
the outside, he is considered as the father of the modern democracy but at the 
same time even the enemies of the liberalism. He is considered as one of the 
well−known descendent of “totalitarian democracy” as it appears in the title 
of the classic book of Talmon.A democracy that is denied the public opinion 
as a free movement and rational debate of divergent opinions, but for some 
reasons pretend to reaffirm not as a written constitution of the State but as a 
group of habits on which the state civilization is build.  
 Thus, a uniform public opinion, as a regiment in which the vigilent 
institute of censure prevails, is translated in the oppression of the disidents 
from the majority. No wonder that the scary phrases which appears in an 
important moment of Social Contract, that is the most important political 
work of Rousseau, according to which the aim of the State is “to urge each 
one of us to be free” he writes:“To force some to be free” or to know what is 
its authentic freedom that coincide with the general will from which, he, the 
careless, pretend to get away39. Precisely because its republicanism is a form 
of democracy without liberalism – noticed Habermas– saysRousseau but on 
the other hand it denies the foundations of the public opinion.In fact, the 
public opinion noticed the German philosopher and sociologist is entirely 
(das Ganz) that consist from the melting of each part (teil). These parts, 
which are united to give life to a whole, naturally are not, expect individuals, 
                                                          
38Matteucci, N., Opinione pubblica, in N. Bobbio, N., -Matteucci, N.,- Pasquino, G., 
Dizionario di politica, cit., p. 637. 
39Rousseau, J.-J., (1970). Il contratto sociale, in J.-J. Rousseau, Scritti politici, p. 742 and 
on. 
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which formed a common conviction, with critic values, which is presicely 
that of public opinion.  
 Thus, why should we have public opinion in its tensed formation, 
with internal divisions and tension in thousands channel, etc., that are 
presicely those that Rousseau condamn and could not value, it is necessary to 
guarantee the freedom of each one. This is the reason that according to 
Habermas become necessary to take another step or the rise of a perspective, 
from the pure republican democratism to liberalism.In historic and philosofic 
terms, it is necessary to go beyond Rousseau to reach the author when the 
Enlightenment is at its peak and in generally the European modern 
philosophy, German philosopher Immunuel Kant.    
 Which is the function of the public opinion in the liberal State 
according to Kant? He is one of the first author of the history of 
contemporary political thought that has done a critical analysis of the 
adjective public and why the noun complement the word publicity40.  The 
Kant ian pol i t ical  wri t ings  are  di fferent  where the themat ic  of  
the  public  is  found intensively and systemat ical ly . For these 
reasons, it is worth to bring back – even Habermas cited the fundamental 
writing “What is Enlightment?” where Kant has urged the readers “to make 
public his reasoning in all the fields”41.So,  i t  i s  a  publ ic  use  of  reason 
in  the  sense that  he wri tes ,  debates ,  arguments  or  s imply sets  
a  discussion on a  subjet  of  common in terest ,  never  speaks,  he 
can not  speak ever  says  Kant ,  as  a  subject  of  purely personal  
but  a lways as  a  c i t izen,  a  member  of  c ivi l  consort ium.  
 Even Matteucci ,  wi th some pervasive considerat ions ,  
that  wi thout  doubts ,  match those of  Habermas .  The receiver  
of  a  publ ic  use  of  the  reason is  double ,  especial ly  in  a  
pol i t ical  regime – emphasizes Kant – still characterized by the absolute 
feeling.  On one hand, naturally the people, which benefitting from the 
public use of the reason, become more and more able to act critically and 
conscious for their fate.  
 On the other hand, the fate is the absolute State itself, which it’s 
important to show – saysMatteuci, rephrasing Kant – that do not have 
advantages to treat the human the same way it is treated a car42.  So,  the 
human– writes Kant –is not treated according the regulation “of police 
State”, but according to the human dignity that belongs, that is in him and 
inalienable from him43.  The ref lect ion of  the  publ ic  core  of  Kant  
                                                          
40Solari, G., La formazione storica e filosofica dello Stato moderno, cit., p. 99. 
41Ivi, p. 103. 
42Kant, I, (1973).  Che cos’è l’Illuminismo?, in Kant, I., Scritti politici e di filosofia della 
storia, Torino, UTET, p. 79. 
43Ivi, p. 130. 
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cont inues to  develop fur ther  even in some his  unforget table 
pol i t ical  wri t ing where we ment ion the wel l  known 
workPerpetual Peace. In this work, Kant is distanced by any “governing” 
concept (at least potentially authoritarian, autocratic and not liberal) of the 
culture and in general of the debate that has to do with the ideas. 
 “Firstly, the people could not enlighten the official people of the State 
for its rights and obligations, but experts or specialists of the rights, 
philosophers.Disbelief in government, which looks always to dominate, it is 
emphasized the distiction between the politics and moral, the indipendence 
of civil society, composed of indipendent and rational individuals from the 
State”44.  
 And where then is the importance of “publicity”? Kant does not 
hesitate to treat this problem noticing that “publicity” as a synonym of 
“public opinion” empower its meaning appears as a intermediate element or 
precisely as a mediator between the politics and moral.Thanks to publicity, 
he notices that the politics is forced to kneel down before the moral” 45.  In 
fact, especially because the politics do not know other than the strong law of 
usefulness, tent inevitably to dominate, returns in interest only to one part not 
the whole of it as it should be in reality. Vice verse, Kant notices that the 
politics could be the cultivation of universal interests only in the moment 
when it is distributed, enlightened and uprised in ethical ideals.  
 Now because through the politics and moral, it is tented more often to 
create a disagreement, and it is the politics the first that denies the reasons of 
the ethics, public opinion develops his function precisely remembering 
politics which is its horizon, that of universal values in which the politics 
should serve not oppress46.  
 The public opinion is composed of a kind of space that even though 
is not institutional it is recognized judicial thanks to the free speech and 
debate. Through gubernaculum  (meant as an instrument and place where 
the power is managed and exercised) and the rank of citizens as private, the 
public opinion sphere is rised as a bridge that connect and unite the private 
and State. The public opinion through newspapers, journalism but over all 
through critic, philosophic and political reflection, and “principle mirror” is 
done: so, time after time executives could see the reflection of their image in 
the concept that the people has created.They will be evaluated, offended or 
censured urging to change the ways of actions47.  
                                                          
44Matteucci,N., Opinione pubblica, cit., p.637. 
45Kant, I.,Che cos’è l’Illuminismo?, cit., p.160. 
46Matteucci, N., Opinione pubblica, cit., p.638.Compared with the thought of J. Habermas, 
Storia e critica dell’opinione pubblica, cit., p. 66 and on., where are developed the same 
thoughts with Matteuci.  
47Kant, I.,  Che cos’è l’Illuminismo?, cit.,p. 101. 
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 One of the cases that has treated Habermas, is divided in the same 
intellectual point of view from some other authors, it is precisely what Kant 
says that the concept of public opinion is at its peak defined as a kind of 
“classic” statement48.  This  should surprise  us .  In  fact ,  the  
Enl ightment  was cal led the century of  enl ighteners .The latest 
were the light of the reason that keep away any superstition, darkness and in 
this way preprared – at least what they believed–an excellent future for 
humanity. There were less illitarates, superstitians, ignorants, and in the 
political plan there less dictatorship, the latest replaced from a politic build 
on rationality, freedom and precisely on public opinion. 
 It is not coincidence that the “classic” treatment of the concept of 
public opinion culminates with Kant, the author that is considered one of the 
German great enlighteners but also of Europe49.  Later, the French 
Revolution started, through which are shaped the liberal and democratic 
ideals in Europe. However, at the same time, the degradation of the French 
Revolutionin the turbulences of terror, and after the authoritarianism of 
Napoleonic  per iod,  and the f i rs t  half  of  the  800s,  a  per iod 
that  favored the publ ic  opinion s tar ted.  
The freedom of speech and of opinion not only was not tolerated but also 
oppressed openly. During the 800s, denying the fundamental achievements 
of the previous century, the concept of public opinion was fading away 
entering in a real crisis.  
 At this point it is worth to mention – based on an author that for some 
reasons is close to Habermas, as it is mentioned above Matteucci and also the 
intellectual journalism brings the debatable and contradictory sides of the 
public opinion concept. What happened in 800s, a century dominated by 
romanticism, very often had anon direct orientation toward the abstract 
rationality of the Enlightenment Era50.  A devaluat ion of  publ ic  
opinion,  compared with the science,  i t  i s  found in  Hegel  
Philosophy of Right; and this devaluation is parallel with that of the civil 
society against the State. 
 For Hegel, the public opinion is a manifestation of the judgements, 
opinions and advices of the privates for their work in general, but is 
recognition other then phenomena, as a union of subjective views, that have 
a formal majority that does not oppose the severity of the sciences. In the 
same way, the civil society, in which is formed the public opinion, is a union 
of anarchic needs and antagonists that do not eliminate the inequalities. You 
could not reach the universality through special interest, because the civil 
society is not organized: for this the self understandings of the public opinion 
                                                          
48Habermas, J., Storia e critica dell’opinione pubblica, cit., p. 36. 
49Cassirer,E.,  (1982). Vita e dottrina di Kant, cit. 
50Cassirer, E., (1976). La filosofia dell’Illuminismo, Firenze, La Nuova Italia. 
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is not representated as a reason; and if through the legislative power of the 
Rule of Law, the class of the privates is increased in the universal things 
participation. The State is changed with the civil society, bringing its 
disorganization within the State, which if wants to be universal, should be 
organic (traditional).  In the organic State we have the integration of the 
citizens from the top, a leap of the civil society, a transition from the good 
sense of the “science”, possible in politics only when you see in the State 
view the carnation of the absolute Soul. We found in Marx a similar 
devaluation of the public opinion in A Contribution to the Critique of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. In Jews Questions, he noticed that in the 
creation of the “political State” the civil society is neutral and depoliticize 
based on the classes and corporations opposing from one hand the private 
individuals and on the other hand a political universal soul that is predicated 
to be independent from special elements of the civil life. 
 The public opinion is only a false knowledge; ideology because in a 
societ divided in classes, covers only the interest of the bourgeois class. The 
audience is not the people, the bourgeois society is not a whole society, 
bourgeois is not citoyen, the private public is not the reason. The public 
opinion is only the ideology of the bourgeois Rule of Law. However, with 
the expansion of the universal votes, there is a tendency of the civil society 
to create a political existence: the weapon of the public, created by the 
bourgeois tent to return against it. When the civil society will have a 
fulpolitical existence, with the class abolition it will cease rejecting the State, 
because the new classes not bourgeois will not have interest to keep the civil 
society as a private sphere divided by the politics. Only then will the public 
opinion realize that the full rationalism of the political power, up to 
abrogation, because the political power is build in a way that one class 
oppresses the other. The political power will merge in the social power, and 
thus the public opinion could perform all its political functions; and the 
disappearance of the private sphere, will be the identity between home 
andcitoyen. 
 Even the liberal generations after Constant and Bentham begin to 
think that the public opinion was not that “uncorrupted” as it was believed 
before: the risk of corruption did not come from the government but from the 
civil society itself, through despotism of the majority or the conformism of 
the mass. Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America, and the same 
thought even John Stuart Mill in On liberty shows how the despotism of the 
mass does not operates through public authorities, executive organs of the 
State but as a psychological pressure form the side of the society to the soul 
and not to the individual physic and because of this it has to choose between 
conformism and marginalism. There is a social control more than a political 
one that does not allow the free development of the individual personali and 
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creation of the audience with rational individuals. The crisis of the public 
opinion comes as a result of two other factors: on one hand the eclipse of the 
reason that shows its legimate that practically it is useful and available for 
the prosperity, which it is reduced in a market account and does not look any 
more in a rational dialogue for universality of the opinions; on the other hand 
“the cultural industry” transforms the intellectual works into simple goods 
destinated for success and consumption and the desire of glory is replaced 
with that of the money. The ideal dialogue between the enlightener and its 
public that Kans sees does not have the conditions to be realized. The critic 
sociology of 900s takes some thoughs fromToucqueville, to show the 
disappearance of the public opinion. As the “great” win, the countries that 
had allow the formation of the rational dialogue of the public opinion 
disappear: in stead of the salon there is the television, the newspaper were 
converted into speculative corporations, organization and parties leaded by 
the oligarch, the spaces of the public opinion formation were not self 
manageable but were administrated by the powerfullburocracy.  
 Meanwhile, the contemporary state, it is less visible the division 
between the State and the civil society, as one has describe the other, and 
leading calss is formed, interested to dominate, and could easy manipulate 
the public opinion. This thing could be adjust only if instutional space is 
created, that allows the effectiveness of the freedom of speech, of press 
through a real participation of the citizens toward the public opinion 
formation: the organization should be forced to control the means of the 
mass communication, to perform their functions toward a dialogically 
formation in a process of the public communication and not that of the 
manipulation of the atomized public, that now has in “the public” not a 
instrument of the rational freedom but the slavery toward the productive 
system. So, the institutional elections should be created to give to the public 
the element that distinguished it: critics. The experience of the totalitarian 
regime, in which “the public” Kantian is converted into a propaganda, the 
existence of the new technology of the mass communication, that disinform 
from the critics and ruin the image of the public opinion. However, the mass 
myth, totally passive toward the public is dipel and as a result the public 
opinion should be affirmed where the freedom of speech and thoughts exist, 
a pluralities and pluralism of the authonom informative organs, which means 
not controlled by the politicians: in this polycentrism balances the public 
opinion is formed in a dual process, that rise form the bottom to the top and 
vice versa, through the leaders of the opinions in local and national level” 51.  
The gold per iod of  publ ic  opinion for  Habermas  was precisely 
the 700s:  an era where the bir th and the spread of 
                                                          
51Matteucci, N., Opinione pubblica, cit., p. 638-639. 
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Enl ightenment ,  and especial ly  thanks to  two great  revolut ions 
– American and French – sees precisely the principle of autodetermination of 
the people triumphing and refusing any imperialist claim (in the case of 
America) and absolutist (in the case of France). So, in the moment where 
there is no constitution, parliamentary government, there is no formal and 
legal inequilties of the citizens before the law, then we will not have an 
available concept of the public opinion, Habermasemphasises. Then why the 
public opinion century – as we see in the above exposure Habermasian – is 
the century that knows the transparency of the journalism, press, clubs and 
organizations. Bourgeois century is the century of the rational debates that 
shed light where there are the critics of enlighteners–form the high 
intellectual spheres of the Volteir, Diderot, D’Alambert, etc. –little by little 
go down, pour on all the bodies of the society and stays precisely in the those 
bodies (bourgeois) that are represented as mediator of the revolution, of the 
change52.  After  the  French Revolut ion,  even the despotic and 
demagogic regression that this has with the so called Terror, it is the period 
of Napoleon53.  After  the  fa l l  of  Napoleon Bonapar te ,  i t  s tar ted 
the period that  i s  known as  the  period of  the  Restorat ion 54.  
Establ ished on the pr inciple  of  the  royal  throne al l iance,  that  
was the “restorat ion” of  the  legi t imate  sovereigns that  the 
per iod of  Napoleon has  fa l len and now, af ter  his  fa l len 
re turned to  their  posi t ions . If we return to the antique period, only 
formally, the liberal, democratic, republican ideals were not looking kindly 
upon, which from what is treated above are the same with the public opinion. 
That’s why, at the same time with the return of the absolutism of that period, 
constitutions, free and parliamentary governments will start to be the object 
of the critics and disputes in many ways. Not only that it is understandable, 
Habermas said, from the govermentals and in general from those that have 
the interest to restore the absolutism; but also from the side of the 
independent intellectuals, which thought that the return of the Restoration 
was also the effect of the natural correction and biassed assignee and great 
distortions that the revolutionary period, and after that of Napoleon has 
brought. 
 That’s why the great political conservatory writers of the Restoration 
era kept a great special value, as thanks to their works –Habermas says–for 
the first time emerged the bias, abstractions, theoretical inadequacy, for 
example, the contradictory, legal, natural concepts of the State, which – to 
express it in the Hegel language – are created to raise the State from the 
                                                          
52Habermas,J.,  Storia e critica dell’opinione pubblica, cited,p. 61. 
53Lefebvre,G., (1989). Napoleone, Roma-Bari, Laterza, p. 19. 
54Della Peruta, F., (1989). Storia dell’Ottocento, Firenze, Le Monnier,expecially chapter III 
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arbitrary and capricious agreement of private individuals, exactly a 
contract55.  
 In fact, to affirm the value of the public opinion, will mean to affirm 
the trust in the people believe to build their fate, meaning to criticize the 
actual one, the absolute State that until that moment is considered as the 
solution of every critic. 
 Regarding the latest the Kant’s work mentioned What is the 
Enlightenment, is really similar.In  this  work,  i t  i s  aff i rmed one  of  
the  glor ious  phrases  that  in  their  use  enforce the essence of  
the  Enl ightenment . Kant writes that if we could define the 
Enlightenment it will be as this motto:  
 “Sapereaude! Have the courage to use your own 
understanding!” 56 
 So, the bourgeois, the one that gives power and life to the public 
opinion as an opinion that expresses the common interest, the one that with 
its opportunities, resound the trust in a constructive and critical force of the 
reason, that the great teachers of the Enlightenment has expressed. Now, in 
the Restoration era, in which we said that the return the principle of the 
alliance of the throne and kingdom, the aristocracy retake the privileges that 
have lost and the power is returned to absolute or unswayed power, it needed 
to report to anyone about they do, it is the concept of the public opinion that 
starts to depreciate and criticize in many ways. 
 So, the image of Hegel, it is very crucial at this point. It is worth to 
mention the quotes of Matteuci, that it is mentioned above, as the researcher 
has the merit of the paralleling that in Hegel pass through the antithesis 
public opinion-science, where the first term is depreciated compared to the 
second, and the antithesis State-civil society, where the first place belongs to 
the State, taking into account that the civil society is an important and 
unexcluded moment but destinated, according to the Hegel view, to resolve 
the supreme unit of the State.We saw above that Habermas–developed the 
topic in a more sociological view –sees the public opinion, at least in its 
golden time, as ideas toss,which are elaborated from intellectuals in a way 
that the prejudice of the concepts that they did not meditate and create in 
primis but were gathered to give their reflection, turning it into a political 
controversy weapon. This process, that reading Habermas, seems without 
doubt physiological and inevitable in the view of the thinker and 
conservatory as Hegel, it brings out a very important problematic. In fact, 
exactly because it is about the reflection of ideas, which do not deepen or 
widen in their authentic and critic concept, the public opinion, you like it or 
                                                          
55Topics treated in the classic work Rosenzweig, F., (1976). Hegel e lo Stato, Bologna, Il 
Mulino. 
56Kant,I., Che cos’è l’Illuminismo?, cit.. 
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not says the great German author, are displayed as a series of repeated ideas 
without a critical, contraversial and fake basis. 
 It is said even above that for Hegel the public opinion is not only a 
phenomenal knowledge: where we need to see the antithesis of the views 
against Kant. In fact, the strictly knowledge is the only valid and controlled 
knowledge that is given to the human. While for Hegel, which overpassing 
the dualism of the phenomena of the reason (reasoning idea) typical of 
Kantianism, find grounds to exaggerate the reality thanks to the unlimited 
power of the reason, gathering the ideas of the reason that are after the 
appearance of the things, phenomenal knowledge means contingent, 
accidental, arbitrary and not coherent knowledge. So the public opinion, 
Hegel says, deserve to formulate in singular. It is in its composition the 
essence of being multiple, plural; to be such, thus a serie of arbitrary, not 
coherent and confused views with each other. In this way, the public opinion 
is divided in many ways of seeing, ideas, prejudices, any kind of unity and 
accurancy.  
 As the Rosenzweig says – the analysis, which correspond with that of 
Habermas – could not have a bigger and sustainable rejection of the 
enlightenement politics57.  In  fact ,  the  publ ic  opinion,  as  we 
perceived even today within the l iberal  and democrat ic  
society as  the  i ron spine,  due to which the civil society force the 
government to return in its steps, to revalue its positions, to be responsible 
and in each case the government is not the only one to govern but always 
exist a civil society that observe it and it is ready to criticize it.For Hegel, it 
is not a very important. The civil society is a kind of contradiction that lives 
–as Hegel says in one of the paragraphs ofElements of the Philosophy of 
Right (paragraph 315-318)58.  
 It is difficult not to quote the thoughts of an author as Bedeschi 
(another author that has the same thoughts with Habermas). According to 
thim, “even more closed in comparisson with Kant; it is the position of Hegel 
regarding public opinion”59.   
 Undoubtedly, it will be biased and untrue to say that Hegel operates a 
single critical solution of the public opinion. The public element could not be 
eliminated (it could not be different from a theoretician as him for the State). 
In fact, many times in Elements of philosophy of right, he said that the House 
and the Senate, - Lower House where the representatives of corporations and 
the Upper House destined to the aristocrats – are obliged to manage their 
                                                          
57F. Rosenzweig, F., (1976). Hegel e lo Stato, Bologna, Il Mulino,  p. 69 . 
58G.W.F., (2012).  Lineamenti di filosofia del diritto, Rome-Bari, Laterza. (the original 
volume appeared in 1812). 
59Bedeschi, G.,(1996). Opinione pubblica, in “Enciclopedia delle Scienze Sociali”, Roma, 
Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana, vol. VI. 
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debates publicly. As Habermas noticed, Hegel does not want to get rid of the 
publicity of parliamentary debates60.  Governmental  and minis ters ,  
could not  imagine to  govern the State  as  their  pr ivate 
proper ty. Naturally, Hegel is more responsible than State exactly due to the 
fact of being universal and divine, is the res publica. 
 Then which is the function that Hegel gives to the strictly public 
parliamentary debates?  It is about a function, we can say “political 
pedagogy”61.  So,  as  i t  seems,  the  conservator  posi t ion of  Hegel  
is  very c lear . He accepts only one movement, from the top to the bottom. 
It belongs to the governmental, ministers that educate the public, civil 
society and not the vice versa. We could say one more that the words of 
Bedeschi seem very suitable, who says: 
 “Hegel gives a big important to public parlamentary debate, as an 
educational instrument of public opinion: he uses the phrase die öffentliche 
Meinun. He excludes the oppose movement, the one that the public opinion 
can affect the Houses transmeting them his own spirit and problems”62.  
 It is about a part which explains many ideas. In the end, to Hegel the 
civil society appears without its own light. It could only follow the private 
works pointing out the topic of “system of needs”(thanks to which he 
appears as one of the first philosophers capable in understanding the 
fundamental importance of the political economy for modern society). 
However, in the political plan, the Hegelian civil society is powerless. Here 
is worth mentioning again the words of Bedeschi, according to Hegel: “the 
people is considered without its monarch, without bureaucratic and state 
organization and without corporations that give a community structure of the 
middle stratum (artisan , industrial and commercial) is for Hegel “the part 
that does not know what it wants”, then he says “to know what you want, 
whatever will that is in itself, the reason is the fruit of a knowledge and 
deeper infiltration, which is not part of the people”63.  
 So, this deeper infiltration and knowledge is part of the politicians, 
bureaucratics, of those that shape the political will with rules, institutes and 
offices. (at this point, he defines the bureaucracy as a class that is not a class 
ormany other times as the general class)64.Thoughts  not  s imilar  to 
those of  Bedeschi ,  we f ind in  Habermas,  who even though i t  
i s  responsible  for  the  importance and the vi tal i ty  of the  
Hegel ian thought ,  could not  unders tand how the conservat ism 
of  Hegel  inevi tably br ings  to  the  abrogation of public opinion as the 
                                                          
60Habermas,J., Storia e critica dell’opinione pubblica, cit., p. 199. 
61 Weil., E, (1988). Hegel e lo Stato, Milano, Guerini, p.63.  
62Bedeschi,G., Opinione pubblica, cit. 
63Ivi, p. 713. 
64Rosenzweig,F., Hegel e lo Stato, cit., p.39 and on. 
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government stimulant and corrective. Let’s see again the Hegelian view 
regarding the important of political pedagogy of the public debate. The 
movement for education and correction goes from top to the bottom and vice 
versa. It is the government, the monarch with its ministers, up to 
bureaucratics, which implement their wills, with legal norms and others that 
remain, thus the civil society members could learn from those that know 
more. A vision with the demagogy of Terror, where the potential of public 
opinion is reduced and it is noticeable the disbelief that the energey of the 
people, left aside, had had especially at the end of French Revolution65.  So,  
even Habermas always thought that seeing a kind of ideal regression in the 
transition from Kant to Hegel in the public opinion concept.   
 
Conclusion 
 In this way, we notice how original is Habermas thought on his 
approach to analyzing many authors idea regarding the public opinion. 
 In view of the german philosopher formation and the point of 
achieving its trajectory we could say that he put together in a logical flow the 
philosopher’s thought rebuilding the concept of public opinion in years. 
Habemas, putting in front of the State to civil society shows how the other 
authors see the role of public opinion.  
 In the bourgeois world, the civil society is distinguished by the state 
and is characterized by Hegel as the "system of needs" or mutual spread of 
trade and manufacturing activities. For Habermas this means that the attempt 
for constructing the meaning of the democracy, would be realized starting 
from the attempt with the historical-genetic substance of the essential phases 
through wich, in Europe, the public opinion is affirmed as the backbone of 
democratic processes. 
 
References: 
AA.VV., (1994) Tre letture di Rousseau, Roma-Bari, Laterza. 
Bobbio, N., (1999).Teoria generale della politica, Torino, Einaudi. 
Bedeschi, G., (1996), Opinione pubblica, in “Enciclopedia delle Scienze 
Sociali”, Roma, Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana, vol. VI. 
Casini, P. (2008). Introduzione a Rousseau, Roma-Bari, Laterza. 
Cassirer,E., (1967). Il problema Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Firenze, La Nuova 
Italia. 
Cassirer,E., (1982). Vita e dottrina di Kant, La Nuova Italia. 
Cassirer, E., (1976). La filosofia dell’Illuminismo, Firenze, La Nuova Italia. 
Della Peruta, F., (1989). Storia dell’Ottocento, Firenze, Le Monnier. 
G.W.F., (2012),  Lineamenti di filosofia del diritto, Roma-Bari, Laterza.  
                                                          
65 Habermas,J., Storia e critica dell’opinione pubblica, cit., p.171 and on. 
European Scientific Journal August 2016 edition vol.12, No.23  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
252 
Derathé,R., (1983). Leggere Rousseau, Roma, Editori Riuniti. 
Habermas, J., (1978) Teoria e prassi nella società tecnologica. Roma-Bari, 
Laterza. 
Habermas, J., (2001). Verità e giustificazione: saggi filosofici, Roma-Bari, 
Laterza. 
Habermas, J, from Ceppa, L., (2007). Morale, diritto, politica, Torino, 
Einaudi. 
Habermas, J., (2003). Il discorso filosofico della modernità, Roma-Bari, 
Laterza. 
Kant, I., (1973).  Che cos’è l’Illuminismo?, në  Kant, I., Scritti politici e di 
filosofia della storia, Torino, UTET. 
Lefebvre,G., (1989), Napoleone, Roma-Bari, Laterza. 
Matteucci N., (2004). Opinione pubblica, in Bobbio N.-Matteucci N.-
Pasquino G. (a cura di), Dizionario di politica, Torino, UTET.  
Matteucci, N., (1984). Alla ricerca dell’ordine politico. Da Machiavelli a 
Tocqueville, Bologna, Il Mulino. 
Price,V., (1993). L’opinione pubblica, Bologna, Il Mulino. 
Sartori, G.,( 1991). Democrazia. Cos’è, Milano, Rizzoli. 
Pacchi, A., (1983). Introduzione a Hobbes, Roma-Bari, Laterza. 
Rousseau, J.-J., (1970).Il contratto sociale,in J.-J. Rousseau, Scritti politici, 
Torino, UTET. 
Viano, C.A., (1997). Il pensiero politico di Locke, Roma-Bari, Laterza. 
Rousseau, J-J, (1970). Scritti politici, Torino, UTET. 
Solari, G., (1985). La formazione storica e filosofica dello Stato moderno, 
Napoli, Guida. 
Talmon, J., (1997). Le origini della democrazia totalitaria, Bologna, Il 
Mulino. 
Weil, E, (1988). Hegel e lo Stato, Milano, Guerini 
  
